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FOCUS: PORTRAIT
OF POST COMMUNAL CONFLICT IN CENTRAL KALIMANTAN
by Irine H. Gayatri, RIDEP
Almost all local intellectuals interviewed during my
field research in early 2003, two years after the conflict,
expressed the same idea - that the conflict was an ultimate
form of “cultural clash” or “ethnic
conflict” between the Dayaks and the Madurese.
Some writings by Dayak intellectuals4, contradict this
viewpoint arguing instead that the “beheading” was
not a tradition of Dayak. The “kayau” tradition
was eliminated during the 1894 Tumbang Anoi peace pact
among the tribes under the Dutch administration. The
recent killings of a man, 54 years, who had once worked
in a logging concession in Sampit, “was an expression,
widely spontaneous, to show solidarity to Dayak families
in Sampit who were in danger (from the Madurese)”.
Far before the conflict erupted, several anthropologists,
e.g. Douglas Miles, tried to reconstruct the interaction
between the Ngaju Dayaks tribes living in Tumbang Gagu
village, Upper Mentaya river with outside settlers coming
from Banjarmasin. 6 Matching it with historical perspectives,
Miles identify several factors that have shaped the performance
of the economic and social structures of the Dayaks.
One factor was that the Ngaju community decreased in
numbers after the migrants coming from banjar entered
their territories and in consequence the Ngaju Dayaks
adapted their economy from “tribesmen” to “peasants”.
While anthropologist Anne Schiller7 tried to draw some
changes within the death ritual of Dayaks as part of
their Kaharingan beliefs after the arrival of World religions
such as Christianity during the 1800s and Islam during
the 1900s. This proved that the Dayaks were not isolated
communities who could adapt to their new environment.
But what made violence occur hundreds of years later?
Was the cultural gap the main factor behind the killings?
Or was it something else? Cultural perspectives to see
the conflict were many, also political point of views.
Analysts like Gerry Van Klinken (KITLV: 2002) have tried
to conclude several factors and argue that the killings
were orchestrated by the local elite who felt unhappy
with their political position under the new autonomy
law. This political contestation seems to fit within
the new political scheme after Soeharto resigned. Like
other elites during the Soeharto regime, for instance,
it was easy to mobilize groups under certain religious
and/ or political lines. Under the new regime, however,
one term that found popularity among people is “regional
sons”, especially during the local election. It
is difficult, however, to say that since Dayaks constituted
almost 80% of contestants during the local governor election
in 2002, they were outraged by this cause. Other anthropologist
from the University of Indonesia argued that the conflict
was initiated by gang of thugs8 that belonged to one
ethnic group rather than an act of spontaneity. The groups’ role
was said to be highly dominant before the conflict in
Sampit for their economic interests. They tended to live
exclusively and could not afford to permit outside groups
interests to intersect with theirs. But when it came
to the matters of “honour”, according to
Parsudi, they tended to use violence. The latter could
not be tolerated and as consequence other Madurese who
were not “preman” were also killed because
they were Madurese.
The most well known scholar after the conflict (also
once a strongest governor candidate from PDI Perjuangan
after the current governor) Professor KM Usop, was once
said to be “primordialist” and a “provocateur” by
mobilizing hatred among Dayak militants during the conflict.
To this, he answered, “I don’t have such
capacity to mobilize people. Those people coming from
hinterland were mainly to see justice. There was no justice
whatsoever to the Dayaks, the law has betrayed us, and
our land has been taken”. Also of the Madurese,
he said, “(they) Were brothers to us. What we despised
(of them) was their habit”. 9 Many flyers, pamphlets,
myths, were spread widely among the regions - not only
within the hot spots such as Sampit, Palangka Raya and
the smaller cities. These reached outside the island
creating more stereotype images of both conflicting groups.
What was worse, the conflict mechanisms by the government
could not be widely accepted except under particular
circumstances. During the conflict, the security apparatuses
were also divided along ethnic lines too! Today, three
years after the tragedy, the public trust in security
system has still not recovered. As one of my key informants
said, “we have seen those taking sides with one
of the armed group”.
The economic grievances of the Dayaks and Madurese non-elites
have also been suppressed and heavily influenced by the
policies taken by the central government. Their grievances
were added by ethno-political tendencies (among particular
groups) in which able to mobilize hatred and sentiments
between groups. (Tomalgola: 2001)
So the problem is complex. Political circumstances, sense
of being marginalized among both groups, and lack of
trust to the government besides between the conflicting
parties with outsiders. ICG said the cultural gap is
far from satisfying in explaining why the violence occurred.
But they also put some balance overview on how the economic
along with political constraints have dislocated Dayak
as well as other indigenous community in the country,
from demographic transformation to the opening access
to sacred forests by logging concession, and uniformity
of local leadership system that replaced by “modern” authority
from national to the village.
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