|
|
GRASSROOTS CEASEFIRE
MONITORING:
An Investigative Mission in the provinces of Sultan Kudarat,
Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur and Lano del Norte
(Initiatives for International Dialogue and Mindanao
Peoples Caucus)
FINAL ASSESSMENT
The investigative mission notes that the ceasefire with
the (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) MILF is in a fragile
state. In the last quarter of the year 2002 and the early
part of January 2003, the investigation found that the
agreement was violated with disquieting abandon. Fault
cannot be laid categorically against either side, but
both parties have done less than they could have, or
probably should have, to ensure the success of the agreement.
While both parties insist that they have adhered unwaveringly
to the ceasefire agreement, in reality each side has
interpreted ambiguous areas of the ceasefire agreement
to their advantage.
ANALYSIS
1) Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Operations
against Terrorists and Criminals
The investigators noted that in the vast majority of
cases, military assaults were launched in pursuit of
criminals (kidnappers, cattle-rustlers) or terrorists
(members of the Abu Sayyaf or the Pentagon gang). Attempts
were made by the investigators to verify these claims,
but no conclusion can be drawn at this point in time.
What can be said though is that military operations said
to have been launched against terrorists or criminals,
have engaged in battle recognized MILF forces that were
found by investigators to have no evident connection
with either a terrorist group or a criminal syndicate.
The investigation notes that there has been an attempt
to curb the apparent misuse of the ceasefire provision
(Article III, No. 9.3) which permitted the “hot
pursuit of suspects by police and military personnel.” The
May 6 Joint Communiqué brokered for the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) by Sec. Noberto
Gonzales (and not the Panel) agreed that:
The AFP / PNP shall convey an order of battle containing
the names and identities of criminal elements… in
MILF areas / communities. (Article 3)
The MILF and the GRP shall form an ad hoc joint action
group against criminal elements. This group will operate
in tandem with their respective co-ordinating committees
on the cessation of hostilities. (Article 4)
However, neither of these articles has been implemented.
Members of the AFP stated very frankly that such an order
of battle was the responsibility of the PNP, and that
it was only in a position of supporting their law enforcement
efforts. However, the investigation notes again, that
nearly all AFP operations conducted were launched in
pursuit of criminals or as anti-terrorist operations.
Indeed, the investigators know of no operation that has
been conducted by the PNP in pursuit of criminals in
MILF areas. For this reason, we recommend that the Department
of National Defence in co-ordination with the Philippine
National Police produce and submit to the MILF the order
of battle against criminal elements in MILF areas.
2) Lack of co-ordination between the Co-ordinating
Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCHs) and
the armed forces
The investigation notes that: on a number of occasions,
prior consultation with the Co-ordinating Committee on
the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) by the MILF could
have prevented an encounter. The October 2002 encounter
in Lanao and the January 2003 encounter in Sultan Kudarat
occurred in part, as a result of the movement of MILF
forces that was not reported to the joint-CCCH.
The failure of the MILF to report the troop movement,
and provide an adequate explanation to the joint-CCCH,
gave cause to the military to consider this a “massive
deployment and / or movement of MILF forces” that
is listed in the August 2001 agreement as a prohibited
provocative act.
The investigation also notes that in every situation
there was a possibility for the AFP to co-ordinate with
its own CCCH, with members of the Local Monitoring Team
(LMT), and with the MILF prior to conducting a military
operation. However, in no investigated incident, did
this happen.
3) Distinguishing Terrorists from Legitimate Rebels
In a number of the reported cases more accurate delineation
between true MILF forces and other armed groups such
as the Abu Sayyaf and the Pentagon gang could have prevented
the conflict. In this respect two things need to be done.
First, the legality of MILF fighters and commanders needs
to be clarified by the PNP or AFP. This should be done
in consultation with the respective CCCH and the Panel.
For instance, in Lanao, the military claimed to be in
pursuit of a Commander that the MILF regard as organic
members of the MILF. Their legality can only be solved
through co-ordination between the PNP / AFP and the two
panels.
Second, the MILF needs to delineate their positions /
communities / camps. The Implementing Guidelines on Security
(Article 2, No. 4) reads:
Henceforth, should there be delineation of lines /
positions agreed upon by both the Parties, any action
that projects forces or fire beyond one party's identified
line / position shall be considered offensive military
operations, which is prohibited under this agreement.
However, there has been no apparent attempt so far to
begin delineating MILF ‘lines / positions’,
or indeed MILF camps. The MILF argue that the camps and
positions recognized in former agreements apply today.
In the current agreement there is a reference to a past
agreement, but it does not explicitly refer to the recognition
of camps. However, the GRP has publicly said that those
camps captured during the 2000 war, would not be returned,
and that this item was non-negotiable
While the ceasefire agreement is not explicit regarding
this question of camps, both sides, it appears, will
continue to make their own contradictory interpretations.
Unless resolved this is likely to be a continuing source
of conflict.
4) No Effort to Demilitarize
Both MILF and GRP are currently recruiting and expanding
their respective forces. The MILF has also acknowledged
it is recruiting and training combatants. And in Maguindanao,
for instance, the 37th Infantry Battalion also admitted
that it was recruiting men to build a larger paramilitary
force.
Although the enlargement of forces is not discussed under
the ceasefire agreement, the current strategy of both
the MILF and the GRP is certainly aggravating the situation.
Nor, the investigators note, is this strategy conducive
either to stable negotiations or to build confidence
between the two parties.
5) Absence of any form of sanction
The Manual of Instruction (Article 3, No. 1, para (i.))
states that:
The GRP-MILF shall inform the GRP-MILF Peace Panels
of any GRP-MILF forces or field commanders committing
violations of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security
Aspect of the agreement of Peace of 2001. It shall be
the responsibility of the GRP-MILF Peace Panels to take
immediate and necessary action to stop any violation
and punish respective forces or military field commanders
who violate the Implementing Guidelines on the Security
Aspect of the agreement of Peace of 2001.
In the incidents investigated, neither panel took any
such action. The probable reason is that there has been
no investigation carried out by the established monitoring
mechanism, the local monitoring team, in any province
except Lanao.
6) Lack of knowledge about the ceasefire
The investigators found that there was little knowledge
about the ceasefire among the local government units,
the affected communities or the ground-level combatants.
7) Impact on Civilians
The investigation notes that the encounters between MILF
and AFP/CAFGU directly led to numerous human rights violations.
The most serious, verified, human rights violations include:
| - |
Civilians killed during a military operation |
| - |
Civilians displayed evidence of being physically
abused |
As a result of the encounter many civilians were forced
to evacuate their homes, and leave for evacuee camps.
A number of those that returned found that their:
| - |
houses were destroyed or burnt |
| - |
livestock was stolen or killed |
| - |
household items were stolen, or destroyed |
| - |
food was burnt or stolen |
Many civilians have not been able to return to their
homes, because either they are prevented by the military,
or their homes have been destroyed. There has been inadequate
assistance given to evacuees in all areas that were investigated.
Often a large quantity of food aid was found to go missing.
The investigation notes that the proper implementation
of the June 2001 agreement on the rehabilitation aspect
(Article B.3) is immediately required.
The Parties shall safely return evacuees to their
places of origin: provide all the necessary financial
/ material and technical assistance to start a new life,
as well as allow them to be awarded reparations for their
properties lost or destroyed by reason of the conflict.
Content
|
|
|
|
