Peacebuilding in Southeast Asia: Overview, Observation, and Way Forward
by Kamarulzaman Askandar
Regional Coordinator
Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN)
Coordinator, Research and Education for Peace
Universiti Sains Malaysia
Email: zam@usm.my

Introduction: Peacebuilding and Peacemaking
Peacebuilding is important because we live in a world where peace is still considered a luxury. There are still many unresolved conflicts in the world. Southeast Asia is no exception.

Peacebuilding is something that does not stand alone. It is part and parcel of the process of "making" peace. If peacemaking is the act of "resolving" or "settling" conflict situations, then peacebuilding contributes to peacemaking by helping build the basic foundation that is needed to bring peoples and groups in conflict together. It helps the conflict resolution process, and this process helps peacebuilding back in return. There cannot be conflict resolution without peacebuilding efforts, and likewise we cannot build sustainable, long term peace without the conflicts being resolved, or at least attempt to resolve it. There have been many situations where conflict resolution has failed because the foundation necessary for peace which could be provided by the peacebuilding process has not been properly laid out.

To be a peacebuilder, one must be a conflict re solver too. One must know what one is doing there in the first place. What is the agenda? What are the objectives? One must understand how a conflict resolution process evolves and what are the pitfalls and challenges ahead. One must know how to "map out" and analyses a conflict situation, know the background, identify the problems, as well as all the actors. Building and maintaining trust with the stakeholders is important and part of building the foundation. Lastly, in this kind of work, one must also know how to negotiate and mediate. You'll never know when this will come in handy. And more likely than not, one will have the chance to practice this skill.

Peacebuilding and Conflict Situations
There are universal elements and problems of conflict situations that can be observed everywhere, which must be understood for peacebuilding to work. They include the following observations about conflict situations.

Firstly, it has been generally observed that the majority of armed conflicts are in the developing world. This present a double jeopardy scenario for most of these places where they are expected to go through the process of nation building and developing the country, while at the same time solving conflicts which have mostly their roots in the nation's history or at least the period prior to independence for most of them. Two issues have also contributed to this problem - development and democratization. Economic development (or lack of it) has been cited as a major problem for peacebuilding. Conflict areas are usually the poorest areas in the country. Poverty is usually rife and divide between the haves and have-not's is usually substantial. As for democratization, it can be observed that many of these countries are going through a transitional stage where democracy is a goal but attaining it has presented problems for the countries. Even when democratic institutions have been successfully built, implementation of policies continue to be a problem, and numerous governance issues like equality, transparency, and corruption continue to plague the country, resulting either in a rejection of the state or the questioning of legitimacy.

The second general observation is that most of these conflicts are of the intra-state type, meaning that they are within the boundaries of these states. Many of them however, have been internationalized due to the nature of the conflicts, "outside" interests, and internationalization by one or more of the conflict parties to get international attention and support. Many of these conflicts have also been known to cause regional instability, for a number of reasons. One is the fact that in a small area like Southeast Asia for example, there are interconnectedness between some of the groups in the sense that the groups fighting a rebellion usually have kin groups across the border in a neighboring country that have been known to help the cause directly or indirectly. These support groups have been known at times to prolong and escalate the conflict. We also see the flow of not only people but also money, and in some cases weapons, as branches sprouted where the displaced peoples settled and there continued a feeling of the need to help the struggles back home. We see parties moving across borders to escape the war in the homeland and inhibiting neighboring countries as refugees, displaced peoples, or other types of immigrants, causing in many cases problems with the local communities and strained relations between governments of the countries involved.

It can also be observed that many of these conflicts are more related to communal and inter communal conflicts. Cohesion and identity tend to form within narrow lines and demands are usually made along these lines, hardening positions and making resolution even more difficult. There also tend to be factionalization and diffusion of power, making it difficult sometimes to determine who are the actual leaders, as well as causing difficulty in assessing the ability of leaders to control actions of their followers. These conflicts tend to be "protracted" and "intractable", and we have to be ready for long drawn battles both on the fighting grounds as well as at the negotiation tables. Victims in this type of conflict tend to experience deep long-term fear and have direct experiences of violence. They are usually vulnerable and are easily manipulated by the major contenders, despite themselves being stakeholders to the conflict situations.

Lastly, it is well known that in these conflicts, formal, governmental, and international mechanisms are limited. Governments, in many cases are parties to the conflicts with their own sets of interests. International intervention at peacemaking is largely frowned upon except in cases where the governments feel that it is to their own interests to invite third party intervention from outside. Even then the scope is usually quite limited in terms of mandate and time (and numbers if the action involves peacekeeping operations). This is why peacebuilding is needed, and this is why peacebuilding needs to involve also tracks two and three, apart from the formal first track.

Hence the challenges for peacebuilding: it needs to address conflict situations as they are presented today. It needs to take into account the "protractedness" of conflicts and develop a comprehensive, multifaceted strategy for ending violence and achieving and sustaining reconciliation. It needs to acknowledge that protracted armed conflict is a system that must be transformed by taking a comprehensive approach to the people who operate it and the setting in which it is rooted. It needs innovative ways to transform international culture based on poorly developed mechanisms with commitment to arms production and accepts availability of weapons as legal and legitimate. It also needs to help in the process of conflict resolution by building and sustaining the foundation for peace; building trust where none existed; and provide the incentives to prevent newly emerging minor armed conflicts from becoming full scale wars.

Peacebuilding also heavily relies on reconciliation of conflicting parties. It involves the human dimensions of conflicts. In many cases the conflicting groups live in close proximity of each other, and in many instances within even the same neighborhood. The victims usually have direct experiences of violent trauma which is associated with the perceived enemies, and tied to a history of grievances and enmity over generations. Severe stereotyping is evident and the conflicts are characterized by deep-rooted, and intense animosity of the perceived enemy. As such, reconciliation is needed as a way out of the status quo - moving away from the issues towards a frame that focuses on the restoration and the rebuilding of relationships. Reconciliation helps promotes encounter between open expression of the painful past and a search for articulation of long-term shared and interdependent future. It provides place for truth & mercy to meet. It is concerned with exposing what happened but at the same time letting go in favor of renewed relationship. Lastly, it recognizes the need to give time and place to justice and peace.

General Strategies of Peacebuilding
The following are some of the general strategies of peacebuilding. First of all, a general "peace inventory" needs to be developed. This can be done as part of the conflict mapping exercise, but it should also entails a more careful look at the "peace" side of the conflict analysis, focusing on the management and resolution of the conflict situation. For example, we need to know who is doing what kind of peace activities, where, and to what degrees of successes or failures. This can be done by doing data gathering, joint research which involves the stakeholders, or by convening a conference (a peace conference or peace "donors" conference) with contributions by all those that have been working on this issue. Then we need to create better channels and coordination, both "vertically" and "horizontally". Trust needs to be established and built upon, information needs to be relayed and shared, and activities need to be coordinated. Many a time we have seen problems of communication and coordination, not only between the parties but also involving the donors and peace "builders". Secondly, strategic resource groups are very important for peacebuilding efforts. If they do not exist, they need to be created. These groups can involve a variety of focus areas like conflict resolution, relief and humanitarian activities, law, economy, development, peacebuilding itself, and post conflict reconstruction. They should at all levels involve the stakeholders including the civil society and representatives of the victims. Linkages must be made between internal and external groups to provide support where support is needed (at the very least moral or emotional support, but hopefully can also involve financial and other resources), and to advice on strategies and activities. These linkages can also contribute to advocacy for peace and to raise awareness at a higher level. The most important thing about these groups is that the roots must be local and must be generated from the soil of the conflict. Capacity building and empowerment of peacebuilders through education, training programs and so on are very important and must be planned for and implemented. Strategic planning which plans for short, intermediate, and long term programs must also be made. There must also be periodic evaluations of these programs and projects to ascertain their impacts, effectiveness, and continued suitability. Most likely many of them would have to be adapted as time goes by. We must also be on lookout for the availability of mechanisms that might help us or the creation of new ones when and if the needs arise. Basically, it involves asking questions about the issues and making plans to answer these questions, from the crisis period all the way to the future or generational period.

Next we will go into the regional specificities of peacebuilding, focusing on the Southeast Asian region. There have been a multitude of peacebuilding activities involving both local and international partners. International peacebuilders have come in to the region through various programs, mostly developmental, humanitarian and relief in nature, but has also involved capacity-building, educational or academic, and advocacy type activities. They have also tended to focus on areas and issues of interest to them. The United Nations and its various agencies has been a popular umbrella for peacebuilding efforts. Two notable cases have been Cambodia and Timor Leste. Conflicts areas, where the conflict is still hot and ongoing, like Southern Philippines, Aceh, and southern Thailand have more or less been neglected by this international body, although there are some agencies like the UNDP that have been involved in southern Philippines on a number of projects. It is for this reason that we need to stress the need for the involvement of peacebuilders especially international ones working together with local peacebuilder as well as the peacemakers involved to create a sustainable peace.

In general, peacebuilding activities have not been really smooth sailing in the region. Despite the push for peace from various stakeholders and donors, there have been nagging problems with peacebuilding activities in Southeast Asia. The basic one includes the lack of willingness of the main parties to resolve the issues. This can be seen at various times in both Aceh and Mindanao. For example, the arrest of GAM negotiators by the Indonesian authority, the latest one while they were coming to Tokyo for the negotiations.

Furthermore, many of the conflicts have not actually been resolved despite the signing of agreements between the parties. Despite signing the COHA agreement in 2002 the conflicts went on and eventually escalated with the implementation of martial law in Aceh a few months later. In Mindanao, the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement and the creation of the ARMM did not result in ultimate peace simply because there are other factions and groups of the Moro's that did not accept the terms of the agreement and the creation of the ARMM. For peacebuilders, all these constitute a nightmare.

The second is when the parties involved are not sure of what they really want. Those that want to help might be getting mixed signals about the willingness to resolve. Facilitators and mediators, and even peacebuilders, might be fed with the wrong information or not enough information by the parties. The third party will already made assumptions about the positions of the parties as part of the preparation exercise. But these assumptions still need to be checked, clarified, and confirmed with the parties. Unsure demands always make it difficult for the third party to figure out the real positions of the parties, and to work out a strategy that will help satisfy the interests and needs of the parties. They cannot really work to give something to the parties if that is not what the parties really want. For example, working on limited autonomy as a possible solution when what the party really wants is independence.

The two problems above are further enhanced when you have a situation where there are intra-party dynamics at work which make it difficult to address the situation of who to work or deal with. Or that there are internal rifts within the parties and groups opposing the process may decide not to cooperate or even sabotage the process. The two case studies, Aceh and Mindanao, clearly show this difficulty. In both Aceh and Mindanao, all parties had internal problems that affected the peace process. For example, there were rifts between the civilian authority (president) and the military leaderships on how to go about the process. This happened in both areas. This also happens to the other side. The MILF, despite being the largest group fighting in Mindanao, does not really represent all the Bangsamoro groups. There are others, such as the MNLF and the Abu Sayyaf group which have their own interests and agendas. The same with the GAM. It does not represent all the Acehnese. Even within GAM there are factions - the local commanders leading the fight in Aceh, and exiled political leaders in Sweden and Malaysia. For external peacebuilders, this also presents a major headache. Who among the local partner should be chosen as the local counterpart? Are they reliable and have the drive and commitment to sustain the activities? In many cases external organization have tended to choose big NGOs as their local partners without realizing that there are other smaller and "localized" ones that can do a better and more effective job. Intra group fighting and competition also adds to the problem. For example, in Mindanao, the major Moro groups have a history of clannishness, and sticking with their own groups like Maguindanao, Meranau, Tausug and so on. In some areas fighting between clans and families is not uncommon.

Then is the question of timing or entry into the process. When is the conflict deemed right for intervention? This is a difficult question to decide given a number of factors including national interests and sovereignty; the practices of non-interference and nonintervention; past experiences with intervention and their successes or failures; the seriousness of the conflict; the level of violence; the level of human sufferings; and our "responsibility to protect". Do we wait for an invitation from the parties, or until the conflict has reached a "hurting stalemate", or even until human sufferings have reached an intolerable limit? (btw, how do we measure the limit?). This also raises a very difficult issue of ethics. If this is difficult, so is the question of when to leave. Many times, there are no clear "exit plan" and the peacebuilding efforts have been affected because of this. The activities are simply not sustainable because the capacity building process is not completed or the donors have come in half heartedly and have decided to move on to other issues or areas.

Other problems from the experience of Southeast Asia include excessive meddling on the part of external donors who come in with their high expectations and a massive bureaucracy. For example, there have been numerous complains about donors wanting to set the agenda and demanding organizational changes before fund is released, as well as the common ones of having to waste their time writing reports after endless reports to satisfy the donors. Local partners are also always wary of the intentions of donors and external partners. For example, they have complained that at times they feel like they are being used by these partners, either as source of information, or for information gathering, or to test out new strategies before they are applied or implemented on the ground. It is common knowledge for them that external partners have their own agenda too and it depends on how both sets of agendas, their's and their partners? can be simultaneously achieved. Local sensitivities thus need to be taken into account. They are of two different levels. The first one involves the governmental level. The principle of non-interference and non-intervention is very sacred to the governments of SEA. Outside involvement, even if they are for the purpose of peacebuilding, is not always welcomed. The other level is the one mentioned earlier about taking into account local sensitivities when doing peacebuilding work. This includes in areas of traditions and religion. It has been mentioned earlier about the independent-mindedness of the parties in the region including the government and other stakeholders. The governments want non-intervention and the people want to be increasingly involved in the decision making process. This presents the kind of change that is going through the region, where on one hand the patronage system still is important and leaders are respected and followed; but on the other hand we see that this has been increasingly challenged by the demands for inclusion, mostly led by younger generations who are more forward minded and willing to take the risks. Cases in point, Mindanao and Aceh.

Peacebuilding efforts in two of the most serious conflict areas in the region, Aceh and Southern Philippines, have been going on for a long time. This is owing to the involvement of their civil society which have by and large, been quite strong, especially in Southern Philippines.

Peacebuilding activities in Mindanao have included many activities done at various levels by various groups, governmental and non-governmental. These activities, especially those involving elements of the civil society have mainly focused on raising awareness about the conflict situation, locally, nationally, and regionally; relief and humanitarian work; education; research; trust building; consolidation of the various groups. There have been active participation of non-governmental organisations in Mindanao involving groups such as the Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID), and the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) among others. The first is representative of advocacy type organizations promoting awareness and pushing for peace. The second was created by the MILF during the peace talks in Malaysia to support developmental programs that can act as a catalyst for peace in Mindanao. At the moment the BDA is working with the World Bank to draw up a needs assessment program as the foundation for peace on Mindanao. Peacebuilding activities have also been carried out by grassroots level organizations which usually include a coalition of local NGOs and interest groups combining their efforts and act as pressure groups on the conflict parties and help sustain people's interests in pushing for peace. These groups include coalitions such as the Mindanao People's Caucus, the Bangsamoro Consultative Assembly, the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS), and the Mindanao Peaceweavers. Research and academic programs have also been useful as tools for peacebuilding and are manifested through various peace programs on campus of various universities such as the Notre Dame University in Cotabato City and the Southern Christian College in Midsayap, as well as non university based programs such as the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies. Religious groups have also been active and a notable activity of interfaith dialogue include the Bishop-Ulama Conference which stresses that peace is something that involves all religion. Lastly, members of the civil society have also been included as observers at the peace talks between the GRP and MILF in Malaysia and this trend is set to continue.

In Aceh, members of the civil society have also been active in peacebuilding activities. Their activities however have been hampered by the nature of the conflict and the continuing seriousness of clashes between the armed parties, the RI and the GAM. Among activities that have been carried out in Aceh include the raising of awareness and advocacy, especially nationally and internationally; capacity building and education; research and data gathering, especially about human rights abuses done by both warring parties; peace education and peace studies. They can also been divided along these lines based on their focus areas. Examples of groups that have been active include the Coalition of the Human Rights NGOs; the Legal Aid Organisation; People's Forum; and the Central Referendum Information Association among others. Other groups include the Aceh civil society task force and the newly created Aceh Institute, which is a coalition of academics focusing on the immediate task of getting peace and post-conflict reconstruction. The nature of their activities has been more clandestine in nature compared to their counterparts in the Philippines. There have been many cases of civil society members being harassed and even murdered while doing their jobs. This has resulted in feelings of fear among the civil society and many of them have in fact fled to other parts of Indonesia as well as overseas for their safety. Many however continue to do their work under different umbrellas.

Conclusions: Some Reflections and Recommendations for Peacebuilding in Southeast Asia

There are still a number of conflict issues around the region that needs resolving. They are of different types and stages. A few observations from the trend of conflicts in the post-cold war era suggest that inter-state conflicts still make up quite a significant number of conflicts in the region, with land border being the major issue in contention in the majority of the conflicts. For example, the Sabah claim by the Philippines; border dispute between Thailand and Malaysia; and competing claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea involving Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan and China; the territorial dispute between Malaysia and Singapore over Pulau Batu Putih (Pedra Blanca), an island about 55 km east of Singapore in the Straits of Johor (as well as host of other issues between the two countries like water, the CPF etc). Also, since the security environment of the area is essentially maritime, another issue for inter-state conflicts is maritime boundaries and offshore territorial claims such as the boundary dispute between Indonesia and Vietnam on their demarcation line on the continental shelf in the South China Sea, near Natuna Island, as well as the more recent one involving Malaysia and Indonesia over Ambalat island in the Sulawesi sea. These inter-state type conflicts have been mostly handled bilaterally, or using the preventive diplomacy strategy of ASEAN. In some cases, like the conflict over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan between Malaysia and Indonesia, and over Batu Putih Island, a third party, the International Court of Justice, has been given the mandate to mediate.

The Southeast Asian region is mostly rife with intra-state conflicts. Examples of these intra-state conflicts are armed communist insurgencies in the Philippines, led by the New People's Army (NPA); the various self-determination type movements including in Southern Philippines, involving the government of the Philippines (GRP), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); the Malay-Muslim self-determination movement in the Southern Thailand provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala; in Aceh in northern Sumatra, Indonesia, led by Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or Free Aceh Movement(GAM);as well as in West Papua, Indonesia, led by the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organization). There are also the problems of spillover from the independence of East Timor, especially refugee problems along the border between east and west Timor; communal conflicts in various parts of Indonesia such as Maluku and Kalimantan; and finally the Muslim fundamentalist threats in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, allegedly under the auspices of the Jemaah Islamiah, based in Indonesia but with memberships throughout the region. The conflicts mentioned here are the more serious ones. There are other issues, less serious but with the potential to disrupt the peace in the region, like environmental issues, poverty, governance, human rights, and justice.

As a way forward, we should focus on the following areas to improve peacebuilding in the region.

Firstly, we must acknowledge peacebuilding as the foundation and an integral part of the conflict resolution process and of peacemaking. We need to look again at a number of things including the need to start peacebuilding process as soon as possible and not wait for conflict resolution and peacemaking to end before starting it. We must be proactive in our ways. There must be pressures put on the conflict parties to resolve the conflicts and peacebuilding can be the foundation for this. Peacebuilding takes a long time because it involves changing the mind set and attitude of the people, which includes the parties and other stakeholders such as the victims. The context could change but attitudes and behavior does not change as fast making peacebuilding necessary. Integral to this is building trust with the parties. If parties do not trust us, they will not allow us into the process. Trust builds over time and over a number of activities. These activities can either be "sponsored-activities" or "joint-activities", depending on the nature of the conflict situations and relations between the parties involved.

Secondly, and closely connected to the first one, is the need to balance between internal and external interests, and to be sensitive to local ways of doing things. Each one of us has our own agendas and objectives. The challenge is to find meeting points for these agendas. Where they meet, focus should be enhanced and activities intensified. We need to be aware that especially in Southeast Asia, the parties, including those we are trying to help tend to be very suspicious and independent minded in many ways. Most of the time, they have their own plans and don't like to be told what to do and how to go about doing it. Too much meddling, no matter how well-intentioned it may be, may cause problems between the donors and the receivers.

Thirdly, and following form the second point, the inclusion of all in any type and level of decision making is very important. Everybody needs to feel that they are part of the solution and not merely spectators, or even worse, only part of the problem. Capacity building for the stakeholders, especially for members of the civil society involve in peacebuilding activities is important.

Fourthly, there is no clear indication on whether peace or justice is more important in the region. In some countries like Cambodia, it can be argued that justice plays second fiddle to peace, but this can simply mean that the people are exhausted with conflicts and war and are willing to sacrifice justice if it means peace can be achieved. However, this may not be the case in the two cases we discussed in this paper. Justice seems to be as important as peace (if not more) especially since too much has been lost and too much is at stake. To them justice is important, if not peace would not come. The same goes for the question of peace and development. Some conflict groups, especially those fighting for self determination have argued that they fight out of duty; not to get development or material wealth but for peace and justice. To them the important issues are identity, sovereignty, and justice.

Fifthly, there are also different schools of thought regarding institutions and institution-building as part of the peacebuilding process. For some, the stronger the institution is, the more functional the process would be, while others think that one should start by empowering the people so that they can participate in nation-building. In Aceh, formal institution for peacebuilding is weak and there is also a continuous need for capacity building as well. In Mindanao, they are both stronger but the process has been hampered by lack of coordination and the perceived insincerity of the parties.

Lastly, the question of reform - institutional, social and economic reforms. To many peacebuilders, this is a necessary outcome of peacebuilding efforts. Such reforms will put in place the foundation to sustain peace in the long term and prevent a recurrence of war and conflict. They are still sorely lacking in the region and must be enhanced. More research needs to be done in this field to determine the focus.

In assessing the outcome of peacebuilding, one could look at the economic, political and social aspects of the international, internal, physical and psychological impacts. Indicators can include levels of suppression or acceptance, level of relationship, and the development of knowledge and capacity. It can be suggested that assessment can be made on how/which approach is more successful, namely their impacts on three levels - individual, society, nation-building, and on positive or negative reinforcements. As shown from the two case studies (and in fact more can be learnt from comparisons which include Cambodia and Timor Leste as well), there is room for contextual differences in the Southeast Asian cases and lessons can be learnt from them.

Finally, some specific recommendations on future programs and activities can be made.
  1. Capacity building for members of the civil society. Organising training's in conflict resolution and peace advocacy.
  2. Building a post-graduate study program in "Peace and Conflict Resolution".
  3. Creating "peace studies" centers throughout the region. Joint collaborative work between these centers. Creating a group or network of like minded scholars and practitioners, and providing them with a platform to exchange ideas. A network of peacebuilders.
  4. Creating a regional "Peace Studies Center".
  5. Promoting peace education and creating peace education programs.
  6. Enhancing research on conflict issues, their causes, and conditions for their resolution.
  7. Bringing forward local and indigenous ways of conflict management and resolution.
  8. Do "conflict-impact assessments" projects in conflict areas to ascertain what the impact of the conflicts has been on the people themselves. And what do they really want.
  9. Organising dialogues between the conflict parties. Especially the second and third level officials. "Problem solving workshops".
  10. Organising "scenario-building" workshops for second and third level members of the conflict parties and the civil society. Imagining of the future and alternatives to violent means.
  11. Development projects to alleviate poverty which can be a cause of conflict in many areas. "Life skills" training's etc.
  12. Focusing on environmental issues. Creating early warning systems and "disaster management" bodies. Enhancing capacity of involved personnel and exposure to strategies and mechanisms from other experts.
  13. Promoting peace journalism. Training's for journalists.
Footnotes
1 Speech given at the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Seminar, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, April 8, 2005.



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