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Sulu: State of
War, Calls for Peace
by Atty. Soliman M. Santos, Jr.
Delegate of the Mindanao Solidarity Network (MSN),
Member network of the Mindanao Peaceweavers
Email: gavroche@info.com.ph
State of War
As the 30 March 2005 media statement of the Sulu Peace
and Solidarity Mission of the Mindanao Peaceweavers network
of civil society peace advocates started off: "There
is a state of war in Sulu right now. Fear and insecurity
prevail despite efforts to bring back the situation to
normalcy. A collective insecurity persists despite renewed
promises of rehabilitation of houses and construction
of roads and bridges. There is a raging cry for justice,
peace and respect for human rights." The mission,
which spanned four days from 27 to 30 March 2005 mainly
in Sulu and partly in Zamboanga City, sought among others
to study and assess the current armed conflict in Sulu
and make the corresponding recommendations for its resolution
or reduction.
First of all, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Misuari group, which is the MNLF main faction with the
biggest armed force, has declared a "state of war" not
only in Sulu but also in its other areas of operation
in the Mindanao islands. But this is without the knowledge
of their detained Chairman Prof. Nur Misuari. This was
clearly stated by MNLF MGen. Khaid O. Ajibon, State Chairman
of its Lupa Sug [Sulu] State Revolutionary Committee,
who also chairs the MNLF unified command for Sulu, Basilan
and Tawi-Tawi, when the mission had a talk with him on
28 March 2005. He takes full responsibility for the declaration
and the corresponding reprisal attacks, arrived at in
caucus and consultation with his men in the field and
pursuant to the sense of the preceding MNLF congress.
This jibes with an earlier media report that the MNLF
Misuari group made a declaration of war through "Tuan
Ghulam Lakimuddin" (nom-de-guerre), their deputy
chief of defense.
The most prominent MNLF Misuari group leader in Sulu,
Ustadz Habier Malik, who led the initial attacks on the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) there on 7 February
2005 in reprisal for their perceived massacre by AFP
soldiers of members of a poor Muslim family, told the
mission on 29 March 2005 that they were currently on
a "temporary defensive" stance to give way
to some mediation efforts by certain local government
officials. Malik now heads the MNLF Jabar Uhod Command
which covers the eastern part of Jolo island, with Ajibon
operationally responsible for the western part. Incidentally,
the mission met with Malik in his residential compound
in Barangay Bitan-ag, Panamao town which the AFP claimed
to be his headquarters camp that it captured on 15 February
2005, followed by a formal Philippine flag-raising ceremony.
The AFP estimates the force strength of the MNLF Misuari
group in Sulu to be about 1,000 (the MNLF says they're
at least twice more than this), while that of the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Sulu to be about 300. The AFP says
that these two forces have basically combined in operations
against the AFP in Sulu.
What Malik said jibes with what Philippine Army (PA)
104 Brigade Commander Col. Nehemias Pajarito told us
on 28 March 2005 that they were currently "holding
back" because of backdoor initiatives for peace
through local intermediaries. The 104 Army Brigade and
the 3rd Marine Brigade, under Lt. Col. Hassan Alamia,
are the two major units of the AFP Joint Task Force Comet
in Sulu which is directly under the AFP Southern Command.
The 104 Army Brigade roughly covers the western part
of Jolo island, and the 3rd Marine Brigade the eastern
part. At the same time, Col. Pajarito indicated that
the AFP had ongoing operations as part of the task force's
mission to destroy the ASG and "other lawless elements," to
include what the AFP and Philippine government calls
the "Misuari Breakaway Group" (MBG). In fact,
one ongoing operation at that time in the vicinity of
the "Karawan complex" tri-boundary area of
Indanan, Parang and Maimbung towns was invoked by Col.
Pajarito to justify certain restrictions on or security
measures for the mission. Ajibon said military operations
were on the rise again, particularly in the Lanao areas,
adjacent to Silangkan, and thus the MNLF have asked their
people (civilian mass base) to withdraw.
As mission partner Fatmawati Salapuddin of the Bangsamoro
Women's Solidarity Forum pointed out, the AFP and MNLF
were currently just avoiding each other but Sulu is small
and so they are bound to get entangled and clash at some
point. This would be especially so if the conflict were
not resolved in due time. The people of Sulu, especially
the evacuees, know this. They know that both sides are
ready or preparing for any eventuality. That is why many
of them have not returned to their homes and farms even
though the main fighting has subsided since 17 February
2005, in anticipation of the possible outbreak of hostilities
again. [The situation of internally displaced persons
in Sulu is to be addressed in another part of the mission
report]. This notwithstanding government and AFP pronouncements
that the situation is "normalizing," i.e. "going
back to the pre-conflict [pre-February 2005] situation. " On
the other hand, Malik himself describes the situation
as "abnormal," precisely because "many
people are not in their own places." Fatmawati puts
it another way, that in Sulu for the past three decades
the abnormal, as in human rights violations, has become "normal," so
that people there just choose to remain silent.
Ajibon speaks also of the AFP's 'hidden war' in Sulu,
which has mainly been for the closure of MNLF camps there
(one might say shades of the AFP "all-out war" against
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Central Mindanao
in 2000 and 2003). He says the AFP has never ended this
war, and that the MNLF will in turn keep to a state of
war unless lifted by its higher authorities, particularly
Chairman Misuari. What does it take to end this state
of war?
Issues of the Conflict
On the side of the MNLF Misuari group in Sulu, particularly
its State Chairman Ajibon, even if the government declares
a ceasefire, they will not do likewise unless there are
talks held between the government and the MNLF on: (1)
the root causes of the war; (2) the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace
Agreement; and (3) justice for Misuari, which are all
seen as interconnected. Malik phrases the issues as the "MNLF
problem" and the causes of the conflict, the root
cause of which is the non-implementation of the Peace
Agreement, which has to be discussed again. He also raises
putting an end to massacres, as what is needed is a "peace
of the living, not of the dead." Ajibon stresses
the importance of knowing the background of their reprisal
attacks against the 104 Army Brigade.
For the MNLF Misuari group in Sulu, the trigger of the
current conflict in Sulu was the 1 February 2005 incident
which it perceived to be a massacre [this issue of whether
it was a massacre or encounter is to be addressed in
another part of the mission report]. For them, this was
only the proverbial straw which broke the camel's back,
which broke their patience after accumulated human rights
(HR) abuses against their people, many of which have
been documented and reported, to no avail [the matter
of HR violations is to be addressed in another part of
the mission report]. As Ajibon put it, the conflict did
not happen just on February 1. That incident is seen
as part of an ongoing conflict of more than three decades.
In this conflict, the MNLF has been asserting the Moro
people's right of self determination (RSD) and the Moro
cause in defense of the Bangsa (the nation), the homeland
and Islam. They have not gotten out of this cause, even
as they have entered into and adhered to the Peace Agreement
in 1996.
To repeat, the MNLF Misuari group continues to hold on
to the Peace Agreement, notwithstanding all their reservations
about it. They treat this with the solemnity of treaties
or covenants which should not be easily broken in Islamic
belief, also loyally recognizing and following the MNLF
leadership under Chairman Misuari who himself signed
the Peace Agreement and its precursor the 1976 Tripoli
Agreement. These agreements have transformed the MNLF
assertion of RSD from one of independence to one of autonomy.
The 1996 Peace Agreement "momentarily compelled
us to stop the war or struggle", says Ajibon. The
Peace Agreement, for them, meant a unilateral ceasefire
on their part pursuant to the spirit of the agreement
even though there was nothing on ceasefire in the letter
of the agreement. In fact, according to Ajibon, they
also "momentarily forgot the MNLF." But since
the government is in their perception 'destroying' the
agreement, then "we are back to being MNLF." In
other words, this has become a wake-up call for the MNLF;
it should also be a wake-up call for the government.
Ajibon says the current conflict in Sulu can end only
if the Peace Agreement is addressed properly. Both he
and Malik call for the reconvening of the tripartite
mechanism of the GRP-MNLF-Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) pursuant to its Dubai or Qatar resolution.
In fact, it is the GRP disregard of this mechanism through
unilateralism which is their main issue regarding the
implementation of the agreement. There are essentially
no other local angles to the conflict like local politics
or rido (clan conflicts) here. Malik sees the raising
of this angle against him as a way of papering over the
MNLF issue. Addressing the Peace Agreement is the issue
for now. If this can be properly done, even the unification
of the main MNLF factions ("There is only one MNLF,
even the MILF is MNLF.") will follow because the
original causes (Bangsa, homeland, Islam) haven't changed.
For now, "if not independence, at least the Peace
Agreement" would be good enough for them. For the
government not to seize the moment, not to see the importance
of restoring confidence of the MNLF Misuari group in
the Peace Agreement, is to go on with business as usual
at its own peril, where the MNLF may finally reject the
agreement in favor of a more radical independence track
now bannered by the MILF.
Ajibon said it quite well: "For as long as the government
only addresses the tip of the iceberg, then how do expect
we to solve it (i.e. the Moro problem)?" The MNLF
lasted this long because of the struggle for RSD, the
attitude being "Victory or the Graveyard!" And
there will always be fresh new generations to carry on
the fight because the incoming generation "is trained
while still inside the wombs of their mothers." The
military approach over three decades, instead of stemming
this inter-generational fire, has had the counter-productive
effect of stoking and rekindling it.
The military commanders in Sulu like Col. Pajarito and
Lt. Col. Alamia are only implementing, as best as they
can of course, higher policy directives to destroy the
ASG and "other lawless elements," which includes
what the AFP and government calls the MBG. The so-called
MBG is seen not as the mainstream MNLF which has an ongoing
peace process with the government but instead mainly
as criminal elements operating outside of, breaking and
being fugitives from the law. They see no reason or need
for a ceasefire for criminals. Besides, who will enforce
it on the other side? so, the Peace Agreement is being
implemented anyway. So, the AFP Joint Task Force Comet
in Sulu is not letting up on its mission to destroy the
ASG and "other lawless elements" inc. the MBG
until their capabilities are destroyed or degraded. Because
these threat groups are still there, continuing military
operations are necessary to protect and consolidate tactical
gains. Col. Domingo Tutaan, Jr., Chief of Staff of the
AFP Southern Command, while disputing the mission's assessment
of a state of war in Sulu, admitted to the mission on
30 March 2005 that the situation there may be described
as 'still volatile.'
Col. Pajarito sees the problem in Sulu as one of asserting
the law. In his view, the people there "respect
the law only when force is behind it." He points
to what he calls the Moro or particularly Tausug "culture
of violence" or "culture of the gun." Lt.
Col. Alamia sees the Sulu problem as the proliferation
of loose firearms among unauthorized persons. Neither
seems to see the Moro issues of the Sulu problem. As
the AFP, they will defend the Constitution "by all
means," but will also abide by whatever political
decision. Several things seem clear enough from all these:
- The proper appreciation,
especially of the political
aspects, of the conflict
in Sulu is beyond the
level of the military
there or even above it
which is only doing its
military job;
- The policy guidance
to them from the national
political leadership
as regards the Sulu conflict
appears to be inadequate;
and
- The military view
tends to dominate policy
at both the Sulu and
national levels when
there is a vacuum or
abdication in policy
leadership by the civilian
authorities concerned.
Col. Pajarito himself
complained of the lack
of consistency and continuity
in national policies
esp. with the peace process
where politics intrudes.
The characterization of the
MNLF mainstream as the "Misuari
Breakaway Group" is
a case in point. This terminology
was used after the Misuari-inspired
revolt in November 2001 in
Sulu and also Zamboanga City.
But the MNLF Misuari group
chaffs at being called the
MBG because they did not
break away from, and in fact
are the mainstream and main
armed force of, the MNLF.
They view the government-recognized
MNLF "Council of 15" as
the real breakaway from the
MNLF, cohabiting with and
promoted by the government
and the military as a tool
for the destruction of the
real MNLF to become an "MNLF
without Misuari." They
see some involvement and
connivance of the Philippine
and Malaysian governments
in this. This has relevance
to the implementation of
the Peace Agreement because
it involves one key party
thereto, the MNLF which was
represented by Misuari. As
it is, both the main pro-Misuari
and anti-Misuari factions
of the MNLF have not (yet)
broken away from the Peace
Agreement.
The government and military view lumping the MBG and
the ASG in Sulu is another case in point. The AFP basis
for this lumping is their encounters with combined MBG-ASG
forces in the field, which to the former is not surprising
because of blood relations arising from the common Tausug
ethnicity (the main Moro ethnic group in Sulu) of the
latter. The MNLF Misuari group just as vehemently denies
any tie-up with the ASG, other than both having a common
enemy in the AFP. First of all, the causes of the two
groups are different. They say they don't like the activities
of the ASG, and in fact cite several instances (e.g.
in Timbangan and Indanan) where they have interdicted
ASG kidnappers, killing fellow Tausugs in the process.
They suspect the ASG to even be some kind of creation
of the AFP as some kind of fifth column on the Moro front,
to foment trouble and thus justify increased funds for
the AFP, aside from cuts from ransom money paid for the
release of ASG kidnapping victims. They complain that
the AFP has been operating not so much in ASG areas like
Patikul as in MNLF areas, resulting in unnecessary encounters.
Malik in particular complains about the AFP's indiscriminate
labeling of its targets or victims as ASG. He says certain
wanted ASG leaders like Radulan and Dr. Abu were long-time
MNLF at least up to the time of the 1996 Peace Agreement
which they did not favor. He says "there is no more
ASG" in Sulu. It may be correct to rather say that
the ASG in Sulu is a small group but which can continue
to create big trouble. Ajibon posits that if things between
the MNLF and the government are resolved, then solving
the ASG problem is next in line for them. leaves the
MNLF Misuari Group (regarding which he uses the government
or AFP term MBG). He sees the interrelationship between
the MBG and the ASG as complicating the Sulu problem.
He says Ajibon is easy to talk to but doubts the latter's
control over his sub-commanders who may have tactical
relations with the ASG. He admits to close working relations
with the AFP Southern Command, particularly its commander
Lt. Gen. Alberto Braganza. He is also careful in dealing
with the MNLF because he belongs to one of the big political
families whose patriarch once led the 'Magic Eight' breakaway
MNLF commanders who turned against the MNLF after being
coopted by Marcos.
Gov. Loong has successfully talked with Malik to back
off from continuing to launch offensives starting February
15 for the sake of the evacuees. This and related local
mediation efforts are some of the few bright spots in
the Sulu situation, aside from the growing peace advocacy
by local civil society organizations, some of which were
indispensable local partners of the mission. He is involved
with a local mediation effort led by an allied town vice-mayor.
They have talked with Malik and relayed his group's issues
to the national leadership. However, the main issue relayed
was not the MNLF issue but the Misuari issue, which the
national leadership said was difficult and problematic
because of the factional situation of the MNLF. The government
also wants them to renew their pledge of allegiance to
the government before sitting down for talks. He bats
for the involvement of Ajibon and Malik in any talks
on the Sulu conflict. (According to Malik, he has no
word yet from the local mediators. It remains to be seen
whether the required 'pledge of allegiance' would be
acceptable to Malik.)
To Gov. Loong's credit, he will "buy peace for Sulu" if
he can. The current conflict has of course affected his
pre-conflict Provincial Executive-Legislative Agenda
to "Rebuild Sulu." Through a "Sulu Leadership
Covenant," he has involved all town mayors and activated
civil society participation. Mayoral presence in their
own towns for whatever eventuality during this critical
period continues to be a concern. As regards the national
government, he now bats for Sulu to be given extra attention
after long-time neglect. He believes that, even with
some fighting, there can still be development in some
parts of Sulu, especially its island municipalities.
Livelihood and infrastructure are not the final solutions
but can help.
Gov. Loong says his provincemate Misuari's five year
governorship of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) unfortunately did not address the problem, with
a lot of funding wasted and livelihood projects for ex-MNLF
combatants not sustained. One concrete manifestation
of this, which the mission saw for itself, is the current
state of discontinuance of Misuari's pet project for
the main island of Jolo, the tenlane Jolo circumferential
highway, now the proverbial boulevard of broken dreams.
Misuari and MNLF management or mismanagement of development
under the old ARMM and the transitional Southern Philippines
Council of Peace and Development (SPCPD) should also
be addressed in any honest-to-goodness review of the
implementation of the Peace Agreement. All told, it all
boils down to this.
Conduct of War
Relevant to the state of war in Sulu is the way the tenday
war in February was conducted. This is a preview of what
could happen again if the conflict is not resolved properly.
The MNLF Misuari group in Sulu prides itself with having
been able to conduct conventional warfare head to head
with the AFP for ten days. The MNLF launched frontal
attacks against AFP fixed positions. The AFP countered
with artillery, aerial bombardment and armored supported
ground troop assaults against MNLF fixed positions in
both the eastern and western fronts in Sulu. The level
of firepower used is a good indication of the state of
war or potential resumption of war. Malik's group alone
had .50-caliber machine guns, .30-caliber machine guns,
81-mm. mortars, 60-mm. mortars, bazookas and a B57, among
others. The mission saw some of these weapons and many
MNLF fighters during its interview with Malik at his
residential compound 'camp.' From the MNLF end, the AFP
used thousands of howitzer (at least 155-mm.) rounds
and cannon (105-mm.) rounds, dozens of 81-mm. mortar
fire, and about 200 bombs (at least 500-pounders) dropped
from OV-10 aircraft. The mission saw some bomb craters
as well as casings of unexploded bombs in the Malik residential
compound, of which we were told there were about 20 such
unexploded bombs.
The AFP said they had at least 77 casualties, i.e. both
killed (38 is one figure) and wounded, while estimating
enemy casualties to be 137. The MNLF, however, admits
to only five among them 'martyred' (killed) while estimating
more than 300 AFP soldiers killed based on death benefit
claims filed. Miraculously, there were, as far as can
be gathered, zero civilian casualties during that ten-day
war. This is largely attributable to the pre-evacuation
of civilians from the battle zones, notably the MNLF-led
evacuation of its own civilian mass base in certain critical
areas. Whether led by the MNLF or on their own after
some pre warnings, the large number of evacuees, reaching
around 70,000 at one point, though with no reported deaths
in evacuation, constitute the real casualties of this
war. Of course, the thinking is that it is better to
evacuate and live rather than stay in place and die.
But all concerned should not push their luck because
there can be no guarantee of zero civilian casualties
next time around.
The absence of civilian casualties during the tenday
war might also be attributed to the conscious efforts
of both sides to avoid such. Aside from the MNLF pre
warnings and pre-evacuations, the AFP says they were
strictly observing rules of engagement to keep collateral
damage against civilians to the barest minimum. In particular,
the AFP says it does not fire (e.g. by artillery or aerial
bombardment) on targets which are unobserved but that
it uses forward observers. The MNLF disputes this, saying
that AFP artillery fire and aerial bombing have largely
or mostly missed them, with some far off the mark. As
one MNLF military commander put it, "they (the AFP)
are fighting against coconut trees." Both sides
claim that they subscribe to the rules of war, including
on the basis of their own terms of reference like Islam,
but admit that strict observance is difficult in the
heat of battle. It was the impression of the mission
that the general level of understanding of international
humanitarian law (IHL) is low on both sides.
One commonality of both sides though is the notion of
battle zones resulting from the planned or unplanned
evacuation of civilians from the areas concerned. The
MNLF in particular prefers this mode of fighting, even
if it goes against the usual mode of the guerrilla as
fish needing a mass base sea in which to swim, and even
if it is inferior to the AFP in manpower, firepower and
other logistics. In fact, the MNLF wants the AFP to move
out of municipal areas where the civilian population
is in the vicinity, so that the combatants can go head
to head in battle. The MNLF counts instead on the fighting
spirit (inc. morale, dedication and willingness to die)
of its mujahideen (holy warriors), popular support, and
knowledge of the terrain of their own homeland which
they are defending. Malik's message to the people of
Luzon and Visayas is to forego with sending their soldier
sons to wage war in Sulu if they do not want to weep
over their sons who return in coffins because the MNLF
would be compelled to defend themselves and their people
in their own homeland. Of course, soldiers are supposed
to be ready to die, more precisely to kill and be killed.
The officers and men of the AFP have their own dedication
to their mandated task to protect the people and the
state, to secure national sovereignty and territorial
integrity, and to uphold and defend the Constitution.
This is what makes this war of brothers unfortunate.
But if there will be war, then let it be according to
the rules.
There are questions of IHL and the rules of war which
arise on both sides. A major one has to do with the heavy
firepower used by the AFP, especially howitzer rounds
(of at least 155-mm.) and aerial bombs (of at least 500
lbs.). Is this already "excessive force," legally
or morally inappropriate for an internal armed conflict
between brother Filipinos? Should that firepower not
be reserved instead for foreign invaders? The way war
is waged may have some bearing, for better or for worse,
on the subsequent peace which has to be waged. According
to some accounts, howitzers were fired from school grounds
and caused nose-bleeding and vomiting among school children.
Col. Pajarito says these weapons were issued to them
by higher headquarters and they will naturally use what
is at their disposal to accomplish their mission. He
speaks instead of "overwhelming force" which
is needed to discourage the enemy so that the situation
in Sulu does not spread to other areas. But it is precisely
the overkill which could generate sympathy in other areas.
Among other MNLF complaints in the AFP's conduct of the
war were the poisoning of water sources, the taking cover
in civilian homes, 'hamletting' or hostaging of a community,
use of civilians as perimeter defense, and then the 'kidnapping'
of cows, goats and other farm animals which they likened
to "acts of terrorism" of the Abu Sayyaf. AFP
complaints of MNLF conduct tend to involve beheadings
and other mutilations, and atrocities against innocent
civilians. The mission did not have enough time to make
a more thorough inquiry into the possible violations
of the laws of war by both sides. It, however, posed
two initial or test questions to the MNLF: on landmine's
and on child soldiers.
Ajibon, who commands MNLF operations in the western part
of Sulu, denied categorically the use of landmine's in
the face of AFP and media reports about it. He says they
are not capable, i.e. cannot afford expensive manufactured
landmine's. He said probably some ASG use them, and that
the AFP attributed landmine use to the ASG previously.
He challenged anyone to indicate areas where the MNLF
may have used landmine's in the current conflict. He
says he does not tolerate this among MNLF forces because
it is detrimental to their own people. He said the MNLF
abandoned using landmine's a long time ago, around 1976,
the year of the Tripoli Agreement and after the early
martial law years under Marcos. However, Malik, who commands
MNLF operations in the eastern part of Sulu, admitted
to his forces employing improvised antipersonnel and
anti-vehicle landmine's which detonate on impact or pressure
in places where enemy forces, not civilians, are expected
to pass. The current international humanitarian norm
bans victim-activated (e.g. by pressure or tripwire)
anti-personnel mines but not anti-vehicle mines, whether
victim-activated or command-detonated. Malik, however,
related an incident where an anti-vehicle mine nearly
blasted a civilian vehicle. After a while, he ordered
to pull out of all planted landmine's. In case of war,
these could be used again.
Ajibon also said his MNLF forces had no child soldiers,
saying minors were not capable of carrying armalites
because they needed to be old enough to possess the necessary
wisdom and experience. On the other hand, Malik said
that child soldiers were a kind of emergency question.
Often, this depends on the exigency of the situation,
not really intended for children to be used as soldiers
but as members of a family having to move or be prepared
for any eventuality. He instead pointed to the phenomenon
of MNLF "elderly soldiers," senior citizens
with white hair still bearing MNLF uniforms and their
preferred weapon of old, the garand, since this unfinished
struggle is their life. The mission saw for itself these "elderly
soldiers" as well as some mujahideen who looked
quite young, maybe even below. This precisely was the
inter-generational fire we mentioned earlier.
This was also a question the mission posed to Col. Pajarito
who was still a lieutenant when he began fighting his
Sulu adversary Ajibon. He had started talking about their
respective sons perhaps taking over the fight after their
retirements or deaths. We asked, when will it all end?
What does it take to end the cycle? In the immediate
or short-term in Sulu, some things can be done towards
that end. The mission hopes to do its part through a
number of recommendations.
Calls for Peace
The following recommendations, some reformulated and
elaborated from the initial 30 March 2005 media statement
of the mission, address the matters discussed above.
Not yet covered here are such matters as the situation
of internally displaced persons, the February 1 triggering
incident, and the issue of human rights violations in
Sulu.
- For the government and the MNLF Misuari group
to hold talks on the status and implementation of
the 1996 Peace Agreement, on the Misuari issue and
on the Sulu situation, the latter discussion to include
the key leaders of the MNLF Misuari group in Sulu.
For the parties concerned to reactivate the tripartite
(GRPMNLF-OIC) mechanism, including the Joint Monitoring
Committee, under the Peace Agreement to oversee not
only its implementation but also the security situation.
The mechanism can even be further improved to become
multipartite, to include all key stakeholders of
peace and development esp. in Sulu.
The immediate concern would be to stabilize the Sulu
situation for prevention of escalation and spillover
and for more effective relief and rehabilitation
of the evacuees. The more strategic concern is to
get the implementation of the Peace Agreement back
on a track where there is the necessary bilateral
participation of the MNLF Misuari group as with the
MNLF 'Council of 15.' It is mainly in this sense
that the bad thing which is the Sulu hostilities
can be turned into a good thing, with strategic bearing
on the broader Mindanao peace process, including
the MILF track of this process. Remember the MILF
at least offered to mediate between the government
and the MNLF regarding the Sulu hostilities. The
MNLF and MILF have had an ongoing unity process which
will have a bearing on the whole peace process. The
government's treatment of the MNLF Misuari group
will have a bearing on the MILF talks.
- For the government and the MNLF Misuari group
to declare at least a temporary SOMO (suspension
of military operations) or SOMA (suspension of offensive
military actions) in Sulu, which does not cover the
Abu Sayyaf. For the parties, in their talks on the
Sulu situation, to explore cooperation in the interdiction
of the Abu Sayyaf. The premise here is determining
correctly who is MNLF and who is ASG in Sulu.
We have called for a SOMO/SOMA because ceasefire
seems to be the hardest word these days, especially
with the AFP but even with the MNLF Misuari group
(though not with the MNLF 'Council of 15' which has
called for a ceasefire, among other quarters who
have made the same call). It is unfortunate that
the main protagonists have gotten caught up in the
semantics of ceasefire, forgetting that what is essential
is the peace which the people of Sulu seek
- Promote and institutionalize education on human
rights and international humanitarian law (IHL),
especially with the AFP, the PNP, and the MNLF Misuari
group in Sulu, tapping for this purpose the Commission
on Human Rights (CHR), the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Philippine National
Red Cross (PNRC) National IHL Committee and various
human rights and humanitarian NGOs.
- For the constitutional principle of the supremacy
of civilian authority over the military to be adhered
to both at the national level and in Sulu, especially
on questions of war and peace. Matters of the peace
process, the MNLF question and Sulu peace and development
should not be mainly left in military hands or determined
by military minds.
While the AFP field commanders and troops? feelings
of revenge against, "getting even" with
or "teaching a lesson" to the MNLF Misuari
group may be strong, this should not be allowed to
override the bigger picture. This is where national
political leadership and statesmanship must take
command in matters like the Sulu situation which
is more political than military in its implications.
The buck stops with the President who can show strength
also in magnanimity.
- Achieve coherence, consistency and continuity
in national policies on the peace process in general
and on the Sulu situation in particular. Review the "Road
Map for Sulu," particularly as it relates to
the MNLF problem.
- Require the active presence of the town and barangay
officials of Sulu for their effective action for
peace and development including local conflict resolution/mediation
efforts and livelihood/business initiatives.
- Maximize civil society participation in Sulu peace
and development efforts, especially in addressing
the conflict between the government and the MNLF
Misuari group and in responding to the Provincial
Executive/Legislative Agenda to "Rebuild Sulu."
Aside from these recommendations of the mission, the
Mindanao Peaceweavers and its local civil society partners
in Sulu in particular, having met and talked with the
key players in the Sulu conflict, also offer whatever
assistance they can give for the mediation and resolution
of this conflict, in the spirit of peace and in solidarity
with Sulu.
Insha Allah. Magsukol.
Many thanks to those who assisted the mission.
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