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KEEPING THE PEACE:
The International Monitoring Team (IMT) Mission
in Mindanao
by Ayesah Abubakar
Program Coordinator,
Mindanao Peace Program
Research and Education for Peace,
Universiti Sains Malaysia
Email:ayesah@seacsn.net
Introduction
The international community confirms the United Nations
significant role in "peacekeeping" activities
across the world today. UN peacekeeping forces located
in several "hotspots" take the crucial task
of preventing and managing violent conflicts or renewed
armed hostilities in as much as a peace process or peace
agreement among parties remain to be at a fragile state.1 Malaysia
has been involved in UN peacekeeping missions since 1960-64
(Congo) and had become an active participant in various
missions in Asia, Africa, Middle East, and Europe where
at some points its officers have held leadership positions.
Recently, Malaysia participated in the East Timor Mission
and with its own officer serving as the mission's force
commander.2 Over the years, Malaysia has accumulated
a great deal of experience when it comes to peacekeeping
operations. On the other hand, its current mission in
Mindanao as the lead force in the International Monitoring
Team (IMT) is historically significant and unique as
this is the first time that it embarks on a non-UN initiative.
This deployment of an IMT in Mindanao is authorized under
the provision of Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter
which allows peace settlement to be managed under a regional
arrangement and upon the invitation of the host
government.3 In this mission, the Malaysian
peacekeepers form as a major contingent in the IMT together
with other participants from Brunei and Libya. The IMT
plays a critical role in supporting the current GRP-MILF
peace negotiations and in continuing the momentum for
the resolution of the conflict in Mindanao.
The GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations and Malaysia The GRP
and the MILF started engaging themselves in peace talks
since 1996, but it was not until 2001 that the Government
of Malaysia came in as their official facilitator and
host to the negotiations. Some of the significant agreements
facilitated by Malaysia were the Agreement on Peace Between
GRP and the MILF of June 22, 2001 (Tripoli Agreement),
the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of
August 7, 2001, and the Implementing Guidelines on the
Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect of
May 7, 2002. In this case, the IMT is not only tasked
to monitor the upholding of a cease fire from both camps
but is also mandated to monitor the implementation of
the above signed agreements and ensure that the peace
process progress to the stage of rehabilitation, reconstruction,
and development of the conflict affected areas. These
two conditions are equally important for confidence building
measures as the peace talks are being pursued and a final
peace agreement is yet to be signed.
The difficulties of the ongoing GRP-MILF peace negotiations
include intervals of cease fire violations, suspension
of peace negotiations, administrative delays, from the
conflict parties and the third party facilitator as well.
With this, the entrance of the IMT physically present
in the conflict area and having direct access to the
GRP and MILF adds another dimension as it further strengthen
the peace process on the whole. In principle, the IMT
is well supported by the GRP and MILF in the conduct
of their work. They are assured of cooperation and "free
movement" from the soldiers of Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the MILF, the GRP-MILF Coordinating Committee
for the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and Local Monitoring
Teams (LMTs) in its field investigations. Nonetheless,
they are escorted by GRP-MILF security during their activities
at all times. In as much as the IMT wants to disseminate
information and publish its investigation reports for
public interest, it is primarily bound to submit its
reports to the GRP and the MILF Peace Panels. And since
the IMT's creation is hinged on the consent and full
cooperation of the conflict parties, the termination
or suspension of their involvement is dependent on the
uncooperative response and declining relationship between
them. This adversarial situation would then manifest
into a more intractable relationship between the GRP
and the MILF.
IMT Deployment
The International Monitoring Team (IMT) was officially
deployed in Mindanao on October 10, 2004 with a one year
mandate. The team is composed of 60 members in which
there are four Libyans, 10 Bruneians, and the rest are
Malaysians. Upon arrival in Mindanao, the members were
re-grouped and stationed in five areas or sectors that
cover the conflict areas, namely, Iligan City, General
Santos City, Davao City, Zamboanga City, and Cotabato
City which serves as its headquarters. Earlier, there
were controversies regarding the refusal of the Mayor
of Zamboanga City to allow the IMT to hold its headquarters
there. This idea of locating the IMT as its headquarters
originally came from the GRP. On the other hand, during
the reconnaissance mission conducted earlier by Malaysia
in March 22-30, 2004, the plan has always been to establish
the IMT headquarters in Cotabato City. In the end, the
GRP did not pursue this idea but has located an IMT office
inside the Armed Forces of the Philippines Southern Command
(AFP-South Comm) Headquarters in Zamboanga City.
All IMT members are financially sponsored by their respected
governments. However, operation costs are borne by the
Philippine government. These include local travel and
accommodation, security, medical facilities, support
staff, and other requirements by the group. The team
members wear their official military uniform and they
do not normally carry any firearms in the conduct of
their mission although they are allowed to do so.
The deployment of the IMT is regarded as an important
commitment by the governments of Libya, Brunei, and Malaysia.
There were top level visits by Malaysian leaders that
demonstrated this unequivocal support to the IMT as peacekeepers
in Mindanao. On separate occasions, Deputy Prime Minister
Mohammad Najib Bin Tun Hj. Abdul Razak (December 2004)
and Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar arrived in Cotabato
City in (April 2005) to personally give a moral boost
to the IMT.
IMT Operations
The IMT operations are carried out according to the specific
role and responsibility it has been given. These roles
and responsibilities are enumerated as follow:
- To observe and monitor the implementation of cessation
of hostilities, as well as the socioeconomic development
of the agreements. This includes receiving reports
from the joint CCCH, LMT, Bangsamoro Development
Agency (BDA), and other stakeholders. Also, the IMT
should assess and determine the validity of specific
reports, protests or complaints of cease fire
violations. These alleged violations and any actions
taken should be coordinated with the Joint CCCH and
LMT. Lastly, the IMT should determine if a particular
report, protest or complaint has been acted upon
substantially and satisfactorily at the level of
the Joint CCCH or LMT, or whether there is a need
for further
verification investigation.
- To conduct field verification and validate any
reported violation.
- To coordinate closely with the Joint CCCH and
LMT on the conduct of the field verification and
validation of the reported violation.
- To report to the GRP-MILF Peace Panels its findings
and assessment of the reported violation.
- To ensure that all reports are classified and
treated accordingly.
In the event of a cease fire violation or report of an
armed confrontation between the AFP and the MILF, the
IMT enters the scene when requested by the two conflict
parties through the Joint CCCH and the LMT. Although
the IMT is directly answerable to the GRP-MILF Peace
Panels, it does not operate autonomously as it would
always have "to coordinate" with the Joint
CCCH and LMT. The IMT is also limited to reporting, and
perhaps, in giving recommendations to the GRP-MILF Peace
Panels.
In one of those first rare social engagements of the
IMT since their deployment in October, several officers
and members based in their Cotabato City headquarters
has had the privilege of presenting their role and responsibility
in a public forum participated by various civil society
organizations (CSOs) in Mindanao.4 The CSOs
were clearly looking forward to working with the IMT
and wanting to make the IMT work as a third force in
upholding the cease fire between the armed groups as
evidenced by their questions and comments. However, it
was only then the IMT has explained what they can and
cannot do while in Mindanao. This, according to their
mandated role and responsibility and as agreed upon by
the peace panels. In spite of this limitation, the CSOs
were generally optimistic and supportive of the IMT's
positive contribution since they observe that their presence
alone has helped deescalate the armed confrontations
from both sides of the AFP and the MILF forces, at least
during that period.
AFP-MILF Armed Confrontations
Generally, the more recent low intensity conflicts that
occurred between the AFP and the MILF forces were caused
by feudal conflicts, or locally known as rido. These
conflicts escalated with the involvement of other elements
from the AFP and the MILF. Another cause is the impact
of the lack of coordination from the AFP in their pursuit
operations of alleged Abu Sayyaf, Pentagon, and Jemaah
Islamiah (JI) groups or individuals, especially when
they are deployed in the MILF areas. The first issue
should have been treated as a local conflict, and if
need be, managed under the MILF's disciplinary body if
it concerns erring members. On the other hand, the latter
issue of ASG, Pentagon, and JI should be appropriately
addressed to the GRPMILF Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG)
which is tasked to "isolate and interdict kidnap-for-ransom
groups and 'other criminal elements' in MILF areas".5 Below
are two of the incidences that occurred early this year
that illustrate such situations. There is clearly a much
needed opportunity for conflict parties to strengthen
their cease fire monitoring mechanisms and bring about
a more active participation of the IMT. It should be
noted that in Case 1, the CCCH and IMT were not able
to prevent the escalation of the conflict in time, but
it has learned its lesson by responding to a brewing
conflict immediately when Case 2 happened.
Case 1: Rido to Pursuit of ASG
The January 7, 2005 armed confrontation in Palembang,
Sultan Kudarat had a background of a feudal conflict
or rido that involved an MILF commander's family and
the Mayor. Out from this existing local conflict, the
AFP has been tip-off that the kidnap-for-ransom gang
or Pentagon group is located in the same conflict area
(a non-MILF area). This information launched the AFP
offensive and killed the involved MILF commander. About
10,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) sought refuge
in nearby areas. On the other hand, the death of the
MILF commander, who was later found out to be not involved
in the rido, has triggered another MILF faction to retaliate
and assault a military outpost in Baranggay Lintangan
in Maguindanao. In March 1, 2005 the CCCH and IMT General
Santos sector lead by Lt. Col Rahman Alavi and Head of
Mission Major General Dato' Zulkiefli Mohamad Bin Zain
Palembang visited the conflict areas particularly the
most affected town of Palembang in Sultan Kudarat as
part of its fact finding mission.6 Even two
months after the violence, the IDPs refused to return
to their homes knowing that the rido between the two
family's continue to be a threat to local security.7
Case 2: Talayan Incident
An AFP military offensive operation was conducted in
the early morning of April 15, 2005, at a known MILF
area in Talayan, Maguindanao. The skirmish resulted to
the deaths of three MILF soldiers and wounding five others.
Casualty from the AFP was not known. Fortunately, this
armed confrontation was immediately halted with the interference
of the Joint GRP-MILF CCCH and the IMT headed by Major.
Gen. Dato' Zulkiefli. It was found out that the AFP offensive
was carried out to pursue alleged Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
elements in that area. However, no JI were found after
the conflict and the culminating investigation of the
monitors. The MILF CCCH recognized the MILF victims as
legitimate members and noted that they were in fact supposed
to conduct a "cease fire advocacy campaign" in
the nearby district on that same morning.8
The Talayan case became significant as the resumption
of GRP-MILF peace negotiation was only several days away.
This has caused much controversy on the sincerity of
the GRP in the peace process. Especially that this is
not the first time that AFP has launched military offensives
just before any peace negotiation is to be held in Malaysia.
The MILF was reported to have submitted a formal complaint
to the GRP-MILF Peace Panels on this incident. However,
the positive outlook of both the GRP-MILF Peace Panels
soon after their meeting last April 18-22 at Port Dickson
in Malaysia, shows that they have not allowed themselves
to be negatively affected by the low intensity conflicts
(as violations of the cease fire agreement). Instead,
they emphasized the progress of the negotiations.9
Conclusion
Malaysia's key role as third party facilitator to the
GRP-MILF peace talks appears promising as it not only
involves itself in the formal peacemaking but has extended
its reach to the field of peacekeeping in the conflict
affected areas in Mindanao. The IMT, being a project
of the GRP and MILF Peace Panels, relies heavily on their
acceptability or credibility to these negotiating parties,
as far as their involvement (in terms of activities)
is concerned. Further, the IMT, being a "guest" third
party in an intra-state conflict is limited with mobility
and access as their security is regarded on a
high priority, mainly by the host country. In spite of
this limitation, however, the IMT is contributing to "confidence
building" between the conflict parties and in preventing
another full scale war. Indirectly, this peacekeeping
exercise also result to some peacebuilding outcomes as
the IMT presence alone is felt in some CSO initiatives.
The various IMT sectors or teams are often invited by
CSOs in their own grassroots peacekeeping activities
and public forum where various issues of the Mindanao
conflict and the GRP-MILF peace process are discussed.
A recommendation on the IMT structure and operation is
for IMT sectors, besides the Cotabato headquarters, to
be more visible in their own efforts. Although some of
the more recent outbreak of violence were located in
nearby Cotabato, the IMT sectors in Iligan, Zamboanga,
Gen. Santos, and Davao should be able to highlight any
progress of the cease fire and the developing working
relationship between the AFP and the MILF forces. This
kind of information would be very valuable to all stakeholders
in disseminating the small gains of the GRP-MILF peace
process on the ground. Further, the positive IMT leadership
in the Cotabato headquarters should be duplicated in
the other IMT sectors that cover the rest of Mindanao.
The impact of the IMT lies on how its presence is felt
by the general public in all the conflict affected areas-during
times of conflict or peace.
The preliminary engagement of the IMT in Mindanao may
have shed some better comprehension of the contemporary
dynamics of the armed conflicts and the whole social,
religious, cultural, environmental, and political issues
of the Mindanao conflict situation that could be helpful
to the Malaysian Secretariat of the GRP-MILF Peace Talks
as maybe reported by the IMT. Yet, there are opportunities
for improvement. The IMT being a good channel for information
for Malaysia can be more open and accessible to working
with CSOs besides their official linkages with the GRP-MILF.
As the mandate of the IMT includes the monitoring of
the more important phase of rehabilitation, reconstruction,
and development of the conflict areas, it should be able
to learn more from the CSO efforts in this field for
example. The IMT, besides its peacekeeping mission, can
also act as "ambassadors of goodwill" in representing
the Malaysian government and increasing its credibility
as the third party facilitator. This diplomacy work is
important especially to the local stakeholders since
much of the relationships within the peace talks have
been primarily limited to the top level-the GRP, MILF,
and the Malaysian Government. It is inherent that the
bigger local stakeholders are requiring more participation
and ownership to the GRP-MILF peace process, especially
so that this is the second attempt of resolving the conflict
in Mindanao (the first attempt being the GRP-MNLF negotiations).
And although this may not happen, there should be other
ways or mechanisms that top level stakeholders can socialize
and champion their efforts across all levels of stakeholders.
The IMT-CSO linkage could provide such a potential mechanism
in gaining more acceptance and support to the ongoing
peacemaking and peacekeeping phases. Conversely, the
IMT can take this opportunity in gathering viable ideas
in making the Malaysian government a better and more
effective third party facilitator in the GRP-MILF peace
negotiations.
Footnotes
1 Kimberly Zisk
Marten, Enforcing the Peace,
Learning from the Imperial
Past (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2004)
2 United Nations
Peacekeeping Mission website
3 A Seminar on "The
Role and Responsibility of
the IMT" organized by
the Institute of Bangsamoro
Studies held at Pacific Heights
Hotel, Cotabato City on December
6, 2004.
4 Ibid.
5 Headline News, "MILF,
GRP AHJAGs meet in Davao City",
published in www.luwaran.com
dated February 6, 2005.
6 News report, "IMT
visits war-torn Palembang town",
published in www.luwaran.com
dated March 3, 2005.
7 Interview with
IMT member in General Santos,
March 15, 2005.
8 Report from members
of Tiyakap-Kalilintad, a grassroots
peacekeeping group organized
by the Consortium of Bangsamoro
Civil Society.
9 News report, "GRP-MILF
Talks, substantial points reached
on ancestral domain",
published in www.mindanews.com,
April 21, 2005.
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